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Outsourcing, Performance, and the Role of E-Commerce:   
A Dynamic Perspective 
 
Abstract 
In a highly competitive global environment, many manufacturers respond by setting up outsourcing 
relations for components and finished products with lower-cost producers on a contractual OEM 
(original equipment manufacture) basis.  In the last decade, we have witnessed a spectacular 
growth in outsourcing activities led primarily by U.S. and Japanese companies, although their 
approaches to outsourcing strategy and supplier relations are different.  However, outsourcing 
strategy is not without drawbacks.  We offer a dynamic perspective of outsourcing strategy and its 
performance implications, in which we argue that there is an optimal degree of outsourcing.  The 
outsourcing-performance relationship takes on an inverted-U shape, implying that as firms deviate 
further from their optimum degree of outsourcing, by either insourcing or outsourcing too much, 
their performance will suffer disproportionately.  We then discuss how e-commerce affects where 
the optimum point of any particular firm is located, hence explicitly linking developments in e-
commerce to changing outsourcing levels. We provide implications for the practice and study of 
outsourcing and e-commerce.  
 
Keywords:  Global supply chain management, outsourcing strategy; Performance; Dynamic 
perspective; E-commerce 
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1.  Introduction 
History has repeatedly shown that in a highly competitive global environment, many 
manufacturers begin to either set up manufacturing facilities in lower-cost locations or outsource 
components and finished products from lower-cost producers on a contractual OEM (original 
equipment manufacture) basis.  Without established sourcing plans, distribution, and service 
networks, it is extremely difficult to exploit both emerging technology and potential markets 
around the world simultaneously.  As a result, the increased pace of new product introduction 
and reduction in innovational lead time calls for more proactive management of locational and 
corporate resources on a global basis.  Following this trend, increased outsourcing of 
manufacturing activities has become a prominent part of the restructuring of firms‘ supply chains 
since the 1990s.  Many academics and consultancy firms seem to support the view of 
outsourcing as one of the key drivers of superior performance.  
Outsourcing strategy is part and parcel of the value chain of corporate activities.  
Outsourcing strategy not only affects but is also affected by the other aspects of the firm‘s supply 
chain.  Levy (2005) has asserted that the core driver of the latest form of global outsourcing is 
the increasing organizational and technological capacity of firms in decoupling and coordinating 
a network of remotely located external suppliers performing an intricate set of activities.   Thus, 
executives should understand and appreciate the important roles that product designers, 
engineers, and production managers, and purchasing managers, among others, play in global 
sourcing strategy development.  Let us take a look at Toyota‘s global sourcing strategy as an 
example.    
Toyota is equipping its operations in the United States, Europe, and Southeast Asia with 
integrated capabilities for creating and marketing automobiles. The company gives the managers 
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at those operations ample authority to accommodate local circumstances and values without 
diluting the benefit of integrated global operations. Thus, in the United States, Calty Design 
Research, a Toyota subsidiary in California, designs the bodies and interiors of new Toyota 
models, including Lexus and Solara. Toyota has technical centers in the United States and in 
Brussels to adapt engine and vehicle specifications to local needs.  Toyota operations that make 
automobiles in Southeast Asia supply each other with key components to foster increased 
economies of scale and standardization in those components—gasoline engines in Indonesia, 
steering components in Malaysia, transmissions in the Philippines, and diesel engines in 
Thailand.  Toyota also started developing vehicles in Australia and Thailand in 2003.  These new 
bases develop passenger cars and trucks for production and sale only in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The Australian base is engaged mainly in designing cars, while the Thai facility is responsible 
for testing them. 
In addition to capitalizing on the comparative advantages of different sourcing locations 
and its own unique capabilities by designing and manufacturing certain components in-house 
(i.e., insourcing), Toyota also reaps the advantages of outsourcing.  To outsource manufacturing 
activities, Toyota adopts both the arm‘s-length and partner models in managing its external 
suppliers.  It would purchase necessary, but non-strategic inputs from independent suppliers on 
an arm‘s-length basis to obtain a lower cost for these inputs.  Examples would be belts, tires, and 
batteries that are not customized and do not differentiate its products from its competitors.  
Strategic inputs that are of high value and provide differentiation (e.g., transmission, engine 
parts) are sourced from suppliers based on strategic partnerships to gain access to suppliers‘ 
capabilities, and yet other activities are still performed inside Toyota (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  
In 2000 Toyota was approached by General Motors and Ford to jointly develop an online 
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business-to-business (B2B) automotive components clearinghouse.  Although Toyota declined to 
join as it was not convinced of the wisdom of standardizing parts with other automakers, General 
Motors and Ford, along with DaimlerChrysler, proceeded to create Covisint to jointly address 
escalating costs and inefficiencies in their supply chain management.
1
   
In this conceptual article, we seek to bring together various empirical trends and to 
provide a coherent explanation for these.  As the Toyota example shows, the first trend is that we 
see increased, yet not unlimited, outsourcing.  The second trend, which we discuss relatively 
sparingly (for more details see for example van der Valk & Wynstra, 2005), is in an increase in 
partnership-type supplier relations.  And the third trend is the adoption of electronic commerce 
(e-commerce) in these supplier relations.  In section 2 we conceptualize global sourcing strategy.  
In section 3 we raise the question on how outsourcing affects firm-level performance, by arguing 
that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between them.  Section 4 takes up the theme of e-
commerce, and describes how the introduction of e-commerce in supplier relations affects this 
inverted-U shape relationship. We conclude by sketching some managerial and research 
implications of our work. 
 
2.  Global sourcing strategy 
Global sourcing strategy refers to identifying which production units will serve which particular 
markets and how components will be supplied for production, and thus includes a number of 
basic choices companies make in deciding how to serve various markets. One choice relates to 
the use of imports, assembly, or production within the country to serve a foreign market. Another 
decision involves the use of internal or external supplies of components or finished goods. 
                                                 
1
 Although its success is debatable, Covisint today supports over 250,000 users, representing more than 
30,000 organizations in over 96 countries in the global automotive industry (Applegate & Collins, 2005).    
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Therefore, the term ―sourcing‖ is used to describe how multinational companies manage the flow 
of components and finished products in serving foreign and domestic markets.  
Sourcing decision making is multifaceted and entails both contractual and locational 
implications. From a contractual point of view, the sourcing of major components and products 
by multinational companies takes place in two ways: (1) from the parents or their foreign 
subsidiaries on an ―intrafirm‖ basis, and (2) from independent suppliers on a ―contractual‖ basis. 
The first type of sourcing is known as insourcing. The second type of sourcing is referred to 
commonly as outsourcing.  Outsourcing can further be broken down into two types:  on an arm‘s 
length or strategic partnership basis.  Similarly, from a locational point of view, multinational 
companies can procure components and products either: (1) domestically (i.e., onshoring), or (2) 
from abroad (i.e., offshoring). 
In developing viable sourcing strategies on a global scale, companies must consider not 
only manufacturing costs, the costs of various resources, and exchange rate fluctuations, but also 
availability of infrastructure (including transportation, communications, and energy), industrial 
and cultural environments, the ease of working with foreign host governments, and so on. 
Furthermore, the complex nature of sourcing strategy on a global scale spawns many barriers to 
its successful execution. In particular, logistics, inventory management, distance, nationalism, 
and a lack of working knowledge about foreign business practices, among others, are major 
operational problems identified by multinational companies engaging in global sourcing.  
Some studies have shown, however, that despite, or maybe, as a result of those 
operational problems, where to source major components seems much less important than how to 
source them (Kotabe & Swan, 1994; Mol, van Tulder, & Beije, 2005; Murray, Kotabe, & Wildt, 
1995).  Thus, when examining the relationship between sourcing and competitiveness of 
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multinational companies, it is crucial to distinguish between insourcing and outsourcing, for 
these two types of sourcing will have a different impact on their long-term competitiveness.  
2.1.  Insourcing 
Multinational companies can procure their components in-house within their corporate system 
around the world. They produce major components at their respective home base and/or at their 
affiliates overseas to be incorporated in their products marketed in various parts of the world. 
Thus, trade takes place between a parent company and its subsidiaries abroad, and also between 
foreign subsidiaries across national boundaries. This is often referred to as insourcing. If such in-
house component procurement takes place at home, it is essentially onshore insourcing. If it 
takes place at a company‘s foreign subsidiary, it is called offshore insourcing. Insourcing makes 
trade statistics more complex to interpret, since part of the international flow of products and 
components is taking place between affiliated companies within the same multinational 
corporate system, which transcends national boundaries.  One-third of multinational companies‘ 
trade is accounted for by insourcing activities between the multinational parent company and its 
affiliates or among those affiliates (UNCTAD, 2002). 
2.2.  Outsourcing 
Dyer, Cho, and Chu (1998) have observed that Japanese companies make a distinction of 
outsourcing as to whether it is based on an arm‘s length or a strategic partnership basis.  In the 
1970s, foreign competitors gradually caught up in a productivity race with U.S. companies. This 
coincided with U.S. corporate strategic emphasis shifting from manufacturing to finance and 
marketing. This strategic shift was based chiefly on a cost-benefit analysis that manufacturing 
functions could, and should, be transferred to independent operators and subcontractors, 
depending upon the cost differential between in-house and contracted-out production.  A 
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company‘s reliance on domestic suppliers for major components is basically a domestic purchase 
arrangement (i.e., onshore outsourcing). Furthermore, in order to lower production costs under 
competitive pressure, U.S. companies turned increasingly to outsourcing of components and 
finished products from abroad (i.e., offshore outsourcing), particularly from such countries as 
China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mexico. Initially, subsidiaries were set up 
for production purposes (i.e., offshore insourcing), but gradually, independent foreign suppliers 
took over component production for U.S. companies. This latter phenomenon is usually called 
offshore outsourcing (or offshore sourcing, for short).  Although there are exceptions such as 
Philips and Sanofi-Aventis, many European firms have been relatively slow in adopting offshore 
outsourcing strategy.   
 Outsourcing helps reduce fixed investment in in-house manufacturing facilities and thus 
lower the breakeven point, which subsequently helps boost an outsourcing company‘s return on 
equity (ROE).  Thus, if corporate executives‘ performance is evaluated on the basis of their 
contribution to the company‘s ROE, they tend to have a strong incentive to increase outsourcing.  
This financial logic appealed in particular to U.S. corporate executives who tend to be evaluated 
on relatively short-term results.   
Unlike their U.S. counterparts who historically managed all suppliers in an arm‘s-length 
fashion, Japanese companies managed their outsourcing activities based on the types of inputs 
sourced.  Although many studies of supplier-assembler relationships in Japan implied that all 
suppliers are part of the keiretsu, this perception is inaccurate (Dyer et al., 1998).  Japanese 
companies differentiate strategic suppliers (kankei kaisha) that fall into the keiretsu category 
from independent suppliers (dokuritsu kaisha) that do not.  In utilizing both types of outsourcing, 
Japanese companies are able to achieve economies of scale using arm‘s length transactions.  At 
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the same time, they also gain access to their suppliers‘ capabilities for strategic inputs by using 
strategic partnerships for improved long-term performance (Dyer et al., 1998).  Therefore, the 
performance implications of outsourcing strategy are multi-faceted and require careful 
examination. 
 
3.  Outsourcing and firm performance 
 
Outsourcing has become one of the buzzwords in managerial practice today.  Similarly, it has 
received an increasing amount of academic attention (Domberger, 1998; Leiblein, Reuer, & 
D‘Alsace, 2002; Porter, 1997; Quinn, 1999).  Yet, conflicting predictions have arisen over its 
performance implications with varying attention for its benefits and drawbacks.  Practitioners are 
now beginning to doubt whether universally prescribing outsourcing is the right way to go (Doig, 
Ritter, Speckhals, & Woolson, 2001).  Indeed, Gottfredson, Puryear, and Phillips. (2005) found 
that about 50% of firms in their sample reported that their outsourcing programs fell short of 
expectations.  Only 10% were highly satisfied with the cost savings, and 6% were highly 
satisfied with their offshore outsourcing overall.  Similarly, Booz Allen Hamilton recently found 
that the success rate of outsourcing deals from the customer‘s perspective was only 12% 
(Fortune, April 3, 2006).   Likewise, some researchers have even suggested that outsourcing may 
not be directly related to performance (Leiblein et al., 2002).   
Thus, our thinking on outsourcing strategy and firm performance may have to be 
redefined.  Watson, Zinkhan, and Pitt (2004) offer a useful theoretical framework for examining 
the performance implications of outsourcing strategy.  When independent firms operate in a 
network, they face two kinds of costs (coordination costs and suboptimality costs) depending 
upon the level of their autonomy in the network.  While their autonomous operations may lower 
coordination costs within a network (albeit maintaining their own respective capabilities), such 
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autonomous operations may result in less than optimal performance for the network as a whole.  
On the other hand, while more coordinated operations by network firms may improve network 
performance, such coordinated operations may result in increased coordination costs. 
The outsourcing strategy literature offers arguments both for and against outsourcing 
strategy.  In essence, those who argue in favor of outsourcing strategy base their argument on the 
benefit of reduced coordination costs as a result of increased autonomous operations by firms in 
a network.  This argument is based primarily on short-term benefits.  On the other hand, those 
who argue against outsourcing strategy derive their view primarily from increased coordination 
costs as a result of the network firms‘ increased attempt to accomplish an optimal network 
performance.   Their argument is based more on long-term benefits.  
Short-term vs. long-term views on outsourcing seem consistent with institutional 
perspectives on managerial innovations (Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997).  Early adopters of 
outsourcing strategy indeed experienced efficiency gains as they were able to reduce fixed 
investment in in-house manufacturing facilities and boost their ROE.  Later adopters may have 
bandwagoned on outsourcing to gain institutional legitimacy, or because of competitive 
pressures in the industry, despite some inherent uncertainties about the long-term costs and 
benefits of outsourcing strategy (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993).  Naturally, some deviation 
from an optimal level of outsourcing is bound to occur and bandwagoning can provide one 
important explanation for it. 
We posit that the outsourcing-performance relationship inherently takes on an inverted-U 
shape, implying that there is an optimum degree of outsourcing for every individual firm and as a 
firm deviates further from its optimum, either by insourcing or outsourcing too much, its 
performance will suffer disproportionately.  Based on this perspective, we first address these 
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arguments and then combine them to develop a dynamic perspective of the performance 
implications of outsourcing strategy for firm performance.  Note that our focus is not on any 
single outsourcing decision or transaction, but rather on the overall extent of outsourcing of a 
business unit, across all of the activities performed to meet customer demand.  
3.1.  The case for outsourcing 
Various arguments have been supplied to make the case for outsourcing. We briefly outline these 
arguments to explain why firms would want to outsource: 
3.1.1. Strategic focus/Reduction of assets 
Through outsourcing activities, a firm can reduce its level of asset investment in manufacturing 
and related areas. Therefore, stock markets usually react favorably to outsourcing since more or 
less similar absolute profit levels can be obtained with lower fixed investments (Domberger, 
1998).  Furthermore, outsourcing can help the management of a firm redirect its attention to its 
core competencies, instead of having to possess and keep updated a wide range of competencies.  
3.1.2. Complementary capabilities/Lower production costs 
External suppliers are often highly specialized in the production of components or products, 
allowing them to produce at lower costs than the outsourcing firm could due to scale economies.  
Therefore, a firm can improve production cost levels by outsourcing non-core activities (Hendry, 
1995; Quinn, 1999).  Firms are increasingly relying on third-party specialists to help with 
administrative matters, thus avoiding the high cost of new technology, and allowing their own 
human resources professionals to focus on transforming their human capital into a real strategic 
advantage (Corbett, 2006).  Indeed, Everest Research Institute‘s recent study found that human 
resources outsourcing arrangements increased by more than 40% in 2005 alone (Corbett, 2006).   
3.1.3. Strategic flexibility 
Global outsourcing may increase the firm‘s strategic flexibility. By using outside sources, it is 
much easier to switch from one supplier to another (Harris, Giunipero, & Hult, 1998).  If an 
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external shock occurs, firms are better able to deal with it by simply increasing or decreasing the 
volumes obtained from an external supplier.  If the same item were produced in-house (i.e., 
insourcing), there would not only be high restructuring costs, but also a much longer response 
time to external events. 
3.1.4. Avoiding bureaucratic costs 
Rising production costs are associated with internal production (D‘Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). 
More generally, there is a lack of a price mechanism and economic incentives inside a firm 
(Domberger, 1998). To the extent that such incentives are missing, firm efficiency will suffer as 
a consequence. 
3.1.5. Relational rent 
In recent years, many researchers have argued that certain relationships with external suppliers 
can deliver competitive advantage (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). By outsourcing items and then 
building idiosyncratic and valuable relationships with suppliers, firms may be able to innovate, 
learn, and reduce transaction costs. 
 
3.2. The case against outsourcing 
Extant literature on outsourcing strategy has also highlighted the disadvantages of outsourcing 
strategy.  
3.2.1. Interfaces/Economies of scope  
Firms may benefit from internalizing production through scope economies (D‘Aveni & 
Ravenscraft, 1994).  Kotabe (1998) has suggested that manufacturing firms, in their outsourcing 
decisions, ought to reflect on the interfaces among R&D, manufacturing, and marketing.  If there 
are important interfaces between activities, decoupling them into separate activities performed by 
separate suppliers will generate less than optimal results and potential integration problems. 
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3.2.2. Hollowing out  
Firms that excessively outsource activities are hollowing out their competitive base (Kotabe, 
1998). Once activities have been outsourced, it tends to become difficult to differentiate a firm‘s 
products on the basis of these activities. Furthermore, a firm could lose bargaining power vis-à-
vis its suppliers because the capabilities of the suppliers increase relative to those of the firm. 
3.2.3. Opportunistic behavior  
External suppliers may behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1985) as their incentive structure 
varies widely from that of the outsourcing firms. Opportunistic behavior allows a supplier to 
extract more rents from the relationship than it would normally do, for example by supplying a 
lower than agreed-on product quality or withholding information on changes in production costs. 
3.2.4. Rising transaction and coordination costs  
Hendry (1995) has emphasized the issue of the high coordination costs incurred due to excessive 
outsourcing.  Firms are limited in their capacity to work with external suppliers as partners, and 
therefore have to prioritize external partners.  If they simultaneously invest time in and pay 
attention to all external suppliers, this would induce very high coordination costs indeed.  
Rottman and Lacity (2006) recently concluded that U.S. customers micromanage their offshore 
suppliers to a much greater degree than they manage their domestic suppliers.  They found that 
transaction costs for offshore projects neared 50% of contract value, compared to 5% to 10% for 
domestically outsourced projects.   
3.2.5. Limited learning and innovation 
A form of learning that is deemed especially important for attaining tacit knowledge is learning-
by-doing.  External suppliers will acquire tacit knowledge by performing the activity, but in this 
case the outsourcing firm cannot appropriate all benefits. Appropriation of innovations and rents 
is always a problem in buyer-supplier relationships (Nooteboom, 1999) because both parties will 
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try to obtain as many private benefits as possible. Furthermore, it may become more difficult to 
innovate, given differing incentives and the subsequent lack of interfaces between firms. 
3.2.6. Higher procurement costs due to fluctuating currency exchange rates 
During the Asian financial crisis, many foreign firms operating in Asian countries learned an 
invaluable lesson on the negative impact of fluctuating currency exchange rates on their 
procurement costs and profitability.  MNCs operating in Asian countries tend to procure certain 
crucial components and equipment from the parent companies and other suppliers using global 
outsourcing.  When Asian currencies depreciated precipitously, these MNCs‘ subsidiaries were 
faced with imported components and equipment whose prices had increased enormously in local 
(i.e., Asian) currencies.  In other words, the more dispersed these MNCs‘ assets, capabilities, and 
activities are due to global outsourcing, the more difficult it is for them to manage wild currency 
exchange rate fluctuations, and the higher the probability that they will suffer from increased 
procurement costs and lower profits (Kotabe, 2002). 
 
3.3.  A dynamic perspective 
Given the conflicting predictions on the performance impact of outsourcing, with some 
arguments in favor of outsourcing yet others against it, there is a need to synthesize the 
arguments. We approach this by evaluating the proposed consequences of each.  Proponents of 
outsourcing argue that firms which procure almost all of their activities internally will be so far 
removed from the market that their efficiency tends to suffer.  In other words, if almost no 
outsourcing is undertaken, there will be no benchmark available that would permit a firm to 
judge how efficient its own activities are relative to the market. If outsourcing is undertaken, 
such a beacon exists. The less outsourcing, the more inefficient firms tend to be. 
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However, others have argued that insourcing has its merits.  Put differently, outsourcing 
also seems to have negative effects on a range of performance indicators. Thus, there are reasons 
to argue for a negative relationship between outsourcing and performance. Opponents of 
outsourcing particularly warn of the long-term detrimental effects of excessive outsourcing. 
Firms that become hollow or virtual lack a solid basis for competing, and can neither innovate 
enough nor learn much. The disadvantages of outsourcing are at their worst when firms 
outsource (almost) everything.  
In general, one could argue that there is a feasible range of outsourcing strategies where 
firms can uphold reasonable performance.  If, however, they implement either very high 
insourcing or very high outsourcing, their competitive position and performance will suffer 
deeply.  Simply stated, too little outsourcing tends to result in internal bureaucratic and other 
non-market inefficiency, while too much outsourcing tends to result in external relational 
inefficiency and technological dependence.  Moving toward a high level of insourcing (i.e., 
vertical integration) implies that firms could lose touch with the efficient production propagated 
by markets.  They could face staggering production costs as some U.S. and British 
conglomerates discovered in the 1980s and 1990s before being dissolved.  The reverse can be 
equally true.  As has been argued by Chesbrough and Teece (1996), virtual is not always 
virtuous.  This is a lesson many dot.com firms have learned over the past several years.  Their 
extreme degree of outsourcing, coupled with a lack of internal capabilities has led to very high 
transaction costs, for example, in terms of having to obtain those capabilities externally through 
acquisitions in the stock market, or even losing touch with reality (Doig et al., 2001; Krugman, 
2001).   
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Combining these two perspectives, we expect an inverted-U shape relationship, since the 
extremes produce the worst possible outcomes, while there is some optimum in the middle (see 
Figure 1).  In other words, a firm has some overall optimal level of outsourcing that lies in 
between complete integration (i.e., insourcing) and complete outsourcing.  This explains why 
firms never integrate all of their activities nor outsource them all.  Also, one should note that we 
do not argue there is a universal single optimum.  Rather, each firm will have its own optimum 
level, depending on factors at the country-, industry-, firm- and transaction-levels. 
 Another justification for this proposed relationship is to consider a firm as a bundle of 
activities needed to satisfy customer demand.  To the left of the optimum we find activities 
which should be best outsourced, because the costs of insourcing do not outweigh the benefits. 
This includes, at very low levels of outsourcing (i.e., near the left hand extreme of Figure 1), 
activities that are simply procured in an arm‘s length manner.  For these activities it is very 
costly to make the wrong decision, to insource when outsourcing is much more appropriate. As 
we move towards the optimum, we find activities where it becomes progressively less clear that 
outsourcing is the best solution. These activities should still be outsourced, but will be 
outsourced through partnerships with external suppliers. This involves reciprocal sharing of 
knowledge with the supplier undertaking production of the activity. 
As we move beyond the optimum, on the right hand side of Figure 1, we will first find 
activities for which integration is the better choice, but not by a large margin. These will be 
produced by the firm itself but with inputs from suppliers and others (open innovation R&D 
activities could be an example). As we move closer to the right hand extreme of Figure 1, we 
find activities for which insourcing should be an increasingly obvious choice, and for which 
making the wrong choice (i.e., outsourcing instead of insourcing) is an increasingly costly 
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mistake.  Outsourcing of top management of a firm comes to mind as an example of this 
category. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.4.  Some empirical illustrations 
In a separate paper (Kotabe & Mol, 2005), we tested this hypothesized relationship empirically 
and find compelling evidence in favor of it. The test involves around 1,100 manufacturing 
businesses operating in the Netherlands.  We regressed their overall performance on their overall 
outsourcing level and a range of control variables, in line with the level of analysis proposed in 
this article, and take into account a time lag to counter problems of reverse causality. The tests 
also showed that the steepness of this curve is moderated by the level of uncertainty the business 
faces, which confirms the importance of the dimensions suggested by transaction cost economics. 
 Other empirical research confirms that there is indeed a spread of activities similar to that 
suggested by the curve presented in Figure 1. There are those activities that are almost always 
outsourced, and for which it matters more how outsourcing is organized. Poppo and Zenger 
(1998), for instance, investigate different types of supplier relations in IT outsourcing. There are 
activities which are closer to the optimum level and which can either be outsourced or integrated. 
The popular press regularly publishes stories on failed outsourcing attempts and management 
consultants have started to suggest there should be some balance in a firm‘s outsourcing levels, 
arguing that ―[f]arming out in-house operations has become a religion. Now it must be tempered 
by reason‖ (Doig et al., 2001, p. 25). Abrahamson (2004) discusses how Cisco outsourced, 
integrated, and again outsourced a particular project over a 2-year time span.  Parmigiani (2007) 
discusses why firms would simultaneously make and buy the same good, reminiscent of earlier 
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discussions of taper integration in the literature. And there is still a class of activities, which is 
probably shrinking as we will discuss in section 4, that is never outsourced, and therefore not 
researched in any detail either. A prominent example would be the making of outsourcing 
decisions and the subsequent management of outsourcing.  Firms keep these activities in-house. 
 
4.  The impact of e-commerce 
This hypothesized relationship can be further extended to bring in the other empirical trends 
mentioned in the introduction, partnership relationships with suppliers and the rise of e-
commerce.  We use the term e-commerce broadly to refer to exchanges culminating in 
transactions between buyers and suppliers based on computer and information technology.  
Examples might include electronic (web-based) auctions, EDI, file-sharing protocols for product 
design, and perhaps even video conferencing. 
Technological change can alter the effectiveness of the make and/or buy options because 
it affects transaction and production costs and firm capabilities
2
.  New technology can for 
instance enable instant contact with a supplier or electronic information sharing between buyers 
and suppliers (Eng, 2004).  These types of information sharing can facilitate coordination 
between various players in a supply chain and thus lower transaction costs.  As Hamel (2000, p. 
99) succinctly put it: ―the fact remains that vertical integration, which was in the past a response 
to high transactions costs (which could be lowered by bringing key functions inside the corporate 
boundary), is becoming less critical in a world where real-time information allows for 
                                                 
2
 We readily acknowledge that there are many other factors influencing optimal and actual outsourcing 
levels. These  would include all kinds of other technologies than e-commerce, like transportation 
technogy or managerial technology, as well as institutional factors. Institutional factors may include items 
like contract law, international trade regimes, intellectual property rights regimes, and economic 
liberalization. A full discussion of what causes changes in outsourcing levels over time clearly extends 
beyond the boundaries of this paper. So while we acknowledge these other factors, our focus will be on e-
commerce alone. 
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transparency and trust between business partners.‖  Hence e-commerce helps facilitate 
partnership relations with outside suppliers. 
There is a long-standing debate around the possible effects of information technology 
(IT) and e-commerce on outsourcing levels.  First, it is argued that that IT reduces the transaction 
costs associated with operating in the market (e.g., Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987).  
Furthermore, reduced communication costs as a result of IT even permit smaller suppliers to 
extend their geographical market boundaries (e.g., Downes & Mui, 1998).  Because of these 
lower transaction costs, it is argued that markets become relatively more beneficial when 
compared to hierarchies.  Hence, the increasing use of IT should lead to more outsourcing, and 
developments in IT indeed are a prime, if not the prime, driver of outsourcing.  On the other 
hand, other authors countered this notion.  Clemons, Reddi, and Rowe (1993) spoke of the move 
towards the middle, by which they implied the formation of networks and partnership relations 
rather than either markets or hierarchies.  Because information becomes so much easier to spread 
to many actors simultaneously through electronic means, for example by copying multiple 
recipients into an e-mail, IT supports electronic networks.  Holland and Lockett (1997) described 
the formation of such networks in more details by explaining how the introduction of EDI 
solidified existing cooperative relations rather than leading to more market-like conditions.  
These authors therefore believed that the introduction of information systems further promotes 
the formation of inter-firm networks of perhaps changing composition in which cooperative ties 
are formed between buyers and suppliers. The option of creating networks of suppliers, 
facilitated by e-commerce, makes outsourcing an even more interesting option.. 
Regardless of the specific form that buyer-supplier relations takes on, whether it be 
arm‘s-length market-like relationships or cooperative network relations, there therefore appears 
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to be broad agreement that the introduction of new information technology supports more 
outsourcing, or put more negatively, makes vertical integration a less attractive alternative, 
although IT can also lower the internal costs of communication substantially.  This impact may 
differ according to the stages of the sourcing process.  E-commerce is particularly effective in 
reducing the costs and increasing the effectiveness of search.  Internet technology, for instance, 
can now be used or to search for providers of offshore outsourcing services all over the globe.  
But the costs of evaluating these suppliers and their product and service offerings are harder to 
change through the use of e-commerce alone.  Evaluation normally involves getting to know the 
other party in details, finding out about the other party‘s history of relations with other buyers 
through personal connections, and establishing effective communications.  E-commerce now 
lends itself somewhat for these purposes, but virtual networks are and will remain at best an 
imperfect substitute for real networks.  This is especially true in B2B transactions, where orders 
are normally specified.  
All things considered, e-commerce has a positive impact on the degree of global 
outsourcing as well as the sophistication with which such outsourcing takes place.  This implies 
that the introduction of e-commerce has two parallel consequences. First, it raises the optimum 
level of outsourcing. The curve we portrayed in Figure 1 shifts towards the right-hand side as e-
commerce is introduced into a supply chain.  This confirms what so many observers have 
suggested: firms not only are outsourcing much more than in the past, say 20 years ago, but they 
can actually profitably do so.  At the same time, e-commerce does not fundamentally alter the 
relationship between outsourcing and performance.  That is, there are still very real limits to how 
much a firm should outsource and deviations from the optimum continue to be costly. Even in a 
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world full of e-commerce, firms need to keep performing some activities in-house to maintain 
effective and differentiated in the eyes of their customers.   
Second, as e-commerce gets introduced, and outsourcing levels go up, firms will 
increasingly engage in partnership relationships with suppliers.  E-commerce enables the transfer 
of relatively more complex and made-to-order components and services to remote external 
suppliers.  As firms outsource more activities, they also enter that range of more complex and 
made-to-order components and services, after having already outsourced their simple and off-
the-shelf components and services at some point in the past.  This is an indirect effect of 
outsourcing, and it implies that e-commerce creates more challenges in terms of managing 
supplier relations and supplier networks. In other words, there is a clear link between the 
introduction of e-commerce, increases in outsourcing, and more partnership relations and 
supplier networks.  There is also a link to subsequent increases and decreases in firm 
performance, based on how well firms adapt to these changed circumstances. 
 
5.  Conclusions and managerial implications 
We have presented a novel perspective on outsourcing and firm performance, arguing there is an 
inverted U-shape. Although this is based on the age-old notion that ‗too much of a good thing 
may be a bad thing‘, or what is known as diminishing returns in economics, it provides newness 
in applying that principle to the study of outsourcing, and in detailing the advantages and 
disadvantages of outsourcing that help produce such a curve. It also helps us understand in a 
more systematic way how it is that e-commerce produces higher optimal, and actual, levels of 
outsourcing. 
Based on our discussion, managers should rethink and redesign their global outsourcing 
activities. Many managers have a strong general sense for what constitutes a sound outsourcing 
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policy.  They realize that outsourcing every activity may lead to disasters, just as much as they 
recognize that not all activities should be insourced.  However, we suggest the above can 
improve managerial decision-making in various respects.  
There is currently a tendency in practice to describe (performance) problems related to 
outsourcing as ―implementation issues.‖  Managers often assume that outsourcing is the proper 
design choice, so they attribute the unsatisfactory performance to implementation problems in 
that suppliers are not well equipped, insufficient guarantees are built into contracts, or market 
circumstances change rapidly.  We suggest that there are much more fundamental objections 
against outsourcing that have nothing to do with implementation problems.  Rather, there are 
limits to outsourcing and many inputs of a firm should not be outsourced. Our work confirms 
managerial intuitions that there is an optimal level. Thus, we help lower the uncertainty 
surrounding managerial decision-making on outsourcing and also improve its quality. 
Managers are often not conscious of the fact that there is an optimal degree of 
outsourcing for their entire portfolio.  Instead of using this portfolio level, they tend to see the 
good or the evil of outsourcing or insourcing particular items or activities in that ―[o]utsourcing 
is more than a bidding process.  Companies don‘t do enough analysis before they jump into it‖ 
(Fortune, April 3, 2006, p.S4).  This helps explain why in practice outsourcing often looks like a 
bandwagoning process. Likewise, many academic approaches have centered on analyzing single 
make-or-buy decisions. To some extent this is appropriate, since outsourcing decisions are made 
on an irregular basis.  However, the performance advantages of outsourcing will only materialize 
when a firm has the organizational capacity to integrate outsourced items/activities into its 
operations.  Furthermore, many companies make outsourcing decisions by evaluating only a few 
options on the basis of their previous experience and by what their competitors are doing, 
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(Farrell, 2006).  For example, in June 2006, Apple Computer pulled the plug on a call center in 
India due to the high cost of operating there (Kripalani & Burrows, 2006), although many 
managers still perceive India as a low-cost location for call centers.   
Managers are in need of guidelines as to where the optimal point lies for their particular 
business at a particular time. Based on the extant literature and our current research, we can 
suggest several indicators to help answer that question including asset specificity, uncertainty, 
firm competences, industry trends, and firm nationality and location.  These factors will help 
determine what is optimal for a particular firm at a particular time.  Timing is crucial, as the 
optimal point will change due to changes inside and outside the firm.  In this article, we 
examined one particular type of change, the introduction of e-commerce.  E-commerce increases 
optimal outsourcing levels, and managers ought to be cognizant of this.  As new e-commerce 
opportunities arise in their environment, the pressure to outsource more activities will mount. 
What would really be useful from a managerial perspective is a model that helps 
determine what the optimal degree of outsourcing is for a firm.  Upon determining that, 
managers could prioritize their set of activities and outsource until they more or less reach 
optimality.  Such a model provides the next challenge for the academic community.  As 
outsourcing strategy is a dynamic process, competing firms may not accurately grasp the full 
benefit (and cost) of outsourcing activities due to causal ambiguity.  Simply bandwagoning on 
the first-mover‘s current outsourcing strategy offers no guarantee for improved performance.  
We suggest that tackling that challenge involves a broader behavioral understanding of how 
outsourcing trajectories of firms change over time and within industries. 
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Figure 1 
The relationship between the degree of outsourcing and firm profitability 
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